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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
 H. Jay Mummert, who pled guilty to a fraud offense, 
took this appeal to challenge the district court's calculation of 
his sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines and the district 
court's denial of his request for a downward departure.  We hold 
that the district court did not err in calculating Mummert's 
sentence under the Guidelines, but we remand for further 
proceedings concerning Mummert's downward departure request. 
 
 I. 
 Mummert, the former chief executive officer of the 
People's State Bank of East Berlin, Pennsylvania, became 
acquainted with a contractor, Richard Myford, and a realtor, 
Sherry Seidenstricker, who had formed a partnership to build and 
market residential properties.  In the fall of 1992, Mummert 
caused the bank to make a $95,000 loan to finance construction of 
a house for the partnership.  According to Mummert's presentence 
investigation report, Mummert "handled [this loan] in an 
irregular fashion.  Indeed, the bank's records ha[d] no complete 
loan application file documenting this . . . loan." 
  
 After the loan was made, Mummert states, he learned 
that independent auditors were conducting an examination of the 
bank's records, and he advised Myford and Seidenstricker of his 
concern that the examiners might discover the irregular loan.  
Myford and Seidenstricker, who were attempting to sell the 
property, then helped to prepare loan applications on behalf of 
the buyers, Paul and Melissa Belzner.  Myford and Seidenstricker 
intended for the bank to make a new $95,000 bridge loan to the 
Belzners and for this money to be used to pay off the original 
loan. 
 The new loan application contained false financial 
information.  It also falsely stated that the Belzners had active 
accounts at the People's State Bank and that they had been 
approved for a mortgage by another lender.  The application was 
accompanied by a forged mortgage commitment letter, and the 
Belzners' signatures were forged.   
 According to his presentence investigation report, 
Mummert inserted some of the false information on the loan 
application, and he was present when the Belzners' signatures 
were forged.  Over a period of time, Mummert then issued $95,000 
in cashier's checks to Myford, who forged the Belzners' 
endorsements and used the checks to pay off the initial 
construction loan.  After the Belzners subsequently informed the 
bank that they had not signed the loan application, the fraud was 
discovered. 
 In August 1993, Mummert was charged in a one-count 
information with causing false statements to be made in the 
  
records of a federally insured credit institution, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1006.  This information alleged that Mummert had 
submitted the false and forged bank loan applications.   
 In September 1993, Mummert pled guilty to this offense, 
and a presentence investigation report was prepared.  The report 
determined that the amount of loss was $95,000 and that Mummert's 
offense level should therefore be increased by six levels under 
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1)(G).  The report also concluded that a two-
level increase for more than minimal planning should be made 
under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(2)(A).  In addition, the report 
concluded that there were no factors that warranted a sentencing 
departure. 
 Mummert's attorney disputed all of these 
determinations.  With respect to the amount of loss, he argued: 
  All proceeds of the $95,000.00 loan 
which constitutes the basis of this 
prosecution went to the construction of 
a home.  That home is presently for 
sale.  The owner of that property has 
advised the bank that they will be 
repaid completely immediately upon the 
sale of the property. . . .  
Furthermore, the bank has long had civil 
redress available to it to secure the 
return of its money if they thought that 
they could do so more promptly that 
awaiting the sale of the home.  The bank 
did not avail themselves of this relief, 
however, because there has never been 
any question regarding the value of the 
home, the willingness to sell it, the 
intention to pay the bank fully upon its 
sale and, thus, the inevitability of the 
return of the full $95,000.00 plus 
interest. 
 
  
 Mummert's attorney also argued that his client's part 
in the completion of a forged loan application did not show more 
than minimal planning, and he contended that a downward departure 
was warranted on several grounds.  First, he argued that such a 
departure was justified under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13 based on 
diminished capacity.  Second, he argued that a departure was 
justified under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), based on a combination of 
mitigating circumstances, including Mummert's benign motive, his 
lack of profit from the crime, his history of childhood abuse, 
and the length of time during which he did not commit any crimes.  
See app. 77-78. 
 The district court adopted "the factual finding and 
guideline application in the presentence report" without comment.  
Id. at 95.  With respect to the defendant's requests for a 
downward departure, the court said the following: 
 This is a very hard problematic case.  I will 
not accept the diminished capacity as reason 
to depart.  If anything, I have given some 
real consideration to a departure based on 
aberration of this man's character in 
performing this.  But the cases I have been 
able to find on aberrant behavior usually are 
combined with an immediate acceptance of 
responsibility and restitution where 
applicable.  So I don't think there can be a 
departure for that reason. 
 
Id. at 86.  This appeal followed. 
  
 II. 
 On appeal, Mummert contends that the district court 
erred in finding that the amount of loss under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 
  
was $95,000.  Instead, Mummert argues, the bank suffered no loss 
because, after the disclosure of the false statements and forged 
signatures on the loan application, Seidenstricker wrote a letter 
to the bank stating: 
 The [property in question] is currently under 
contract with a new buyer.  Application for a 
mortgage is presently being made. 
 
  Upon receiving a commitment from the 
mortgage lender a settlement date will be set 
and the proceeds shall be paid to The Peoples 
State Bank. 
 
  If for some unforeseen reason the home 
is not sold I will gladly sign the above 
mentioned property over to The Peoples State 
Bank to ensure that your loan is covered. 
 
Relying on United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1991), 
Mummert argues that the bank's loss should have been calculated 
to be zero since it could have obtained the property pursuant to 
Seidenstricker's offer.  We disagree. 
 In Kopp, the defendant had been convicted for 
fraudulently obtaining a $13.75 million bank loan.  This loan was 
secured by a mortgage.  "[T]he bank demanded and received a deed 
in lieu of foreclosure and eventually sold the property for $14.5 
million, $750,000 more than the face value of the loan."  Kopp, 
951 F.2d at 524.  "The bank nonetheless calculated that it 
actually lost approximately $3.4 million overall, due to lost 
interest . . . , the bank's operating expenses when taking over 
the property . . . , and the cost of a low-interest loan to the 
new purchaser."  Id.  The sentencing judge held that the full 
  
face value of the loan -- $13.75 million -- constituted the loss 
for guidelines purposes, but our court reversed, stating: 
  We . . . hold that fraud "loss" is, in 
the first instance, the amount of money 
the victim has actually lost (estimated 
at the time of sentencing) not the 
potential loss as measured at the time 
of the crime.  However, the "loss" 
should be revised upward to the loss 
that the defendant intended to inflict, 
if that amount is higher than actual 
loss. 
 
Id. at 536; cf. United States v. Daddona, No. 93-7338 (3d Cir. 
Aug. ___, 1994) slip op. at ____ (amount of loss under § 2F1.1 is 
amount taken from bank in fraud scheme, not consequential damages 
incurred by bank in completing project); United States v. 
Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928, 937-38 (3d Cir. 1992) (in three-party 
fraud case, amount of loss under § 2F1.1 is "gross gain" to 
defendant in amount of face value of fraudulent loans).  Our 
court also noted that Application Note 7, which had been 
promulgated after Kopp's sentencing, "confirm[ed]" and 
"buttress[ed]" our interpretation of U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1.  Kopp, 951 
F.2d at 527 n.9, 534.   
 This new Application Note was in effect at the time of 
Mummert's sentencing, and therefore we apply it directly here.  
This Application Note states in pertinent part: 
 In fraudulent loan application cases . . . 
the loss is the actual loss to the victim (or 
if the loss has not yet come about, the 
expected loss).  For example, if a defendant 
fraudulently obtains a loan by 
misrepresenting the value of his assets, the 
loss is the amount of the loan not repaid at 
the time the offense is discovered, reduced 
by the amount the lending institution has 
  
recovered (or can expect to recover) from any 
assets pledged to secure the loan.  However, 
where the intended loss is greater than the 
actual loss, the intended loss is to be used. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, Application Note 7(b). 
 Applying this interpretation here, the loss is the 
actual loss to the bank at the time of sentencing ($95,000) 
"reduced by the amount the lending institution has recovered (or 
can expect to recover) from any assets pledged to secure the 
loan" ($0).  The fact that Seidenstricker offered, after 
Mummert's crime was detected, to make a gratuitous transfer of 
the property in question does not alter this calculation.  A 
defendant in a fraud case should not be able to reduce the amount 
of loss for sentencing purposes by offering to make restitution 
after being caught.  See United States v. Shaffer, Nos. 93-
7508/7549 (3d Cir. Aug.    , 1994); United States v. Frydenlund, 
990 F.2d 822, 826 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 337 
(1993); United States v. Rothberg, 954 F.2d 217, 219 (4th Cir. 
1992); United States v. Carey, 895 F.2d 318, 323 (7th Cir. 1990).  
The same rule applies when the offer of restitution is made by a 
third party who was involved in the offense in the way that 
Seidenstricker was here.  Consequently, we hold that the district 
court did not err in determining that the amount of loss for 
sentencing purposes in this case was $95,000. 
 Mummert also maintains that the district court erred in 
finding that he had engaged in "more than minimal planning" 
within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(2)(A) and that he had 
not clearly demonstrated "acceptance of responsibility for his 
  
offense" within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a).  These 
findings are reviewed for clear error.  See United States v. 
Singh, 923 F.2d 1039, 1043 (3d Cir.) (acceptance of 
responsibility), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 937 (1991); United States 
v. Cianscewski, 894 F.2d 74, 82 (3d Cir. 1990) (more than minimal 
planning).  We find no clear error in this case. 
  
 III. 
 Mummert also argues that the district court erred in 
denying his request for a downward departure.  Under United 
States v. Denardi, 892 F.2d 269, 271-72 (3d Cir. 1989), our 
jurisdiction to entertain this argument depends on the basis for 
the district court's ruling.  If the ruling was based on the 
district court's belief that a departure was legally 
impermissible, we have jurisdiction to determine whether the 
district court's understanding of the law was correct.  By 
contrast, if the district court's ruling was based on an exercise 
of discretion, we lack jurisdiction.  Id.; see also, e.g., United 
States v. Love, 985 F.2d 732, 734 n.3 (3d Cir. 1993); United 
States v. Bierley, 922 F.2d 1061, 1066 (3d Cir. 1990).   
 Here, unfortunately, the district court did not state 
expressly whether its denial of the defendant's departure request 
was based on legal or discretionary grounds.  Since U.S.S.G. § 
5K2.13 makes clear,1 and the government apparently acknowledged 
                     
1
.  U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13 states: 
 
 If the defendant committed a non-violent 
offense while suffering from significantly 
  
at the time of sentencing, that a downward departure for 
"diminished capacity" is permissible under some circumstances, it 
seems quite likely that the district court's refusal to depart on 
this ground was discretionary.  The basis for the district 
court's rejection of the defendants remaining departure 
arguments, however, is impossible to discern from the record, and 
therefore we are unable to determine whether we have jurisdiction 
to review the district court's rejection of these remaining 
arguments.  Faced with the ambiguous record before us, we might 
conceivably assume for the sake of argument that the district 
court's rulings were based on the belief that a downward 
departure was not legally permissible on the grounds cited.  We 
could then proceed to analyze whether each of the many factors 
cited by the defendant, either singly or in combination, could 
justify a downward departure. 
 There are, however, at least two reasons, one formal 
and one practical, for not taking this approach.  First, this 
approach would require us to address one aspect of the merits of 
the defendant's departure request before determining that we have 
jurisdiction.  Second, this approach might well result in a 
significant waste of time.  If we determined, after analysis, 
(..continued) 
reduced mental capacity not resulting from 
voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants, 
a lower sentence may be warranted to reflect 
the extent to which reduced mental capacity 
contributed to the commission of the offense, 
provided that the defendant's criminal 
history does not indicate a need for 
incarceration to protect the public. 
  
that a departure was legally permissible on one or more of the 
grounds cited by Mummert and remanded the case to the district 
court, we might well learn that the district court had always 
intended to reject Mummert's departure request as a matter of 
discretion. 
 Accordingly, in cases such as this, where the record 
does not make clear whether the district court's denial of 
departure was based on legal or discretionary grounds, we believe 
that the appropriate course of action is to vacate the sentence 
and remand for the district court to clarify the basis for its 
ruling.2 
 This holding is consistent with our decision in United 
States v. Georgiadis, 933 F.2d 1219, 1222-24 (3d Cir. 1991).  In 
that case, we were able to determine, based on the record, that 
the district court's refusal of a downward departure was based on 
discretionary grounds.  See Id. at 1224.  The defendant in that 
case contended, however, that a district court must do more than 
just make clear whether a refusal to depart is based on legal or 
discretionary grounds.  Instead, the defendant contended that the 
                     
2
.  The Tenth Circuit recently held that "unless [a district] 
judge's language unambiguously states that the judge does not 
believe he has authority to downward depart, we will not review 
his decision."  United States v. Rodriguez, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 
18697, 1994 WL 383186 (10th Cir. 1994).  This rule appears to be 
designed to promote essentially the same objective as the rule we 
adopt in this case, i.e., to encourage district courts to make 
clear whether their departure rulings rest on legal or 
discretionary grounds.  Under the Tenth Circuit's approach, 
however, a defendant whose departure request is rejected with an 
ambiguous ruling based on legal grounds would apparently be 
deprived of the appellate review to which he is statutorily 
entitled.  Our approach would not allow this to occur. 
  
"sentencing court must always indicate on the record that it 
knows it has authority to depart, considered the defendant's 
request to do so, and decided not to depart."3  Id. at 1222.  We 
held that such recitals are not mandatory.  Id. at 1222-23.  
Thus, Georgiadis did not concern the question whether a 
sentencing court must provide a record that is sufficient to 
enable us to determine whether we have appellate jurisdiction; 
rather, Georgiadis concerned the question whether a sentencing 
court that refuses to make a departure on discretionary grounds 
is required to provide additional statements.  Consequently, 
Georgiadis is consistent with our holding here. 
 
 IV. 
 For these reasons, we vacate the sentence imposed by 
the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.  In taking this approach, we emphasize that we 
have not reached any conclusion with respect to the question 
whether a downward departure on any of the grounds cited by 
Mummert would be legally permissible. 
                     
3
.  In Georgiadis, the defendant suggested that the record did 
not make clear whether the district court had denied his 
departure request on legal or discretionary grounds.  United 
States v. Georgiadis, No. 90-3224, Appellant's Br. at 21-26.  The 
government disagreed, stating that the record showed that the 
trial judge had made "a discretionary nonappealable refusal to 
depart."  No. 90-3224, Appellee's Br. at 25 (emphasis in 
original).  Our court agreed with the government's interpretation 
of the record.  See 933 F.2d at 1224. 
 
